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ARGUMENT

Amicus Has Failed To Demonstrate That Eric Scott's Contempt Conviction Is
Precluded By The First Amendment
Eric James Scott appeals from the district court's order affirming the
judgment of conviction entered upon the magistrate court's finding that Scott was
guilty of criminal contempt. After the parties completed appellate briefing, the
Idaho Supreme Court granted the American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho's
(hereinafter "Amicus") Motion for Leave to Appear as Amicus Curiae. (9/19/13
Order.) Amicus subsequently submitted briefing to this Court.
While the state largely relies on its previously submitted briefing, it will
respond to some of the arguments presented in Amicus' brief.

A.

Scott's Contempt Conviction Is Not Precluded By The First Amendment
Amicus argues that Scott's contempt conviction is precluded by the First

Amendment. (Amicus brief, pp.1-10.) In so doing, Amicus appears to contend
that the magistrate and district courts should have applied the stringent "clear
and present danger" constitutional standard, or some other heightened First
Amendment review, to Scott's conduct.

(Id.)

However, because the caselaw

relied on by Amicus is distinguishable from the present case, Amicus has failed
to show that the type of conduct Scott engaged in is subject to enhanced First
Amendment

protection,

or that the

First Amendment precludes

Scott's

conviction.
Amicus cites In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 236 (1962) for the
proposition that "an attorney's words alone 'cannot amount to a contempt of
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court so long as the lawyer does not in some way create an obstruction which
blocks the judge in the performance of his judicial duty."' (Amicus brief, p.1.)

In

McConnell, the United States Supreme Court analyzed a federal trial court's
application of 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1 ), which regulates the "drastic procedures of
summary contempt power." McConnell, 370 U.S. at 234. The Court recognized
Congress' legislative intent to limit the use of these "drastic procedures" to
situations which constituted an "immediate interruption of court business."

~

McConnell does not expressly reference the First Amendment, and instead
simply holds that McConnell's conduct did not actually interrupt the court's
business, and thus could not be the subject of a summary contempt proceeding
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1 ).

~

at 230-236.

As in the federal courts, summary contempt in Idaho is a "drastic" judicial
power in which the contemnor is not given prior notice of the charge of contempt
or an opportunity to determine whether the charges are true. I.R.C.P. 75(a)(4).
An Idaho judge may only exercise this expansive power where the contempt is
committed in open court in the immediate presence of the judge. I.R.C.P. 75(b).
Scott, however, was not held in summary contempt. Instead, he was subjected
to non-summary contempt proceedings, in which he was entitled to, and
received, prior notice of the contempt charge and an opportunity for a hearing.
I.R.C.P. 75(a)(5). (R., pp.6-7.) Neither McConnell, 18 U.S.C. § 401(1), nor the
requirements of I.C.R.P. 75(a)(4) have any application to the present case.
Further, to the extent McConnell may be instructive as to First
Amendment contempt jurisprudence, Amicus' reliance on and selective quotation
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from that opinion are misguided. While Amicus quotes (Amicus brief, p.1 ), from
McConnell the proposition that an attorney's words alone "cannot amount to a
contempt of court so long as the lawyer does not in some way create an
obstruction which blocks the judge in the performance of his judicial duty," it
omits the portion of the quotation that speaks to one of the state's arguments on
appeal.

In full, the relevant quotation reads, "The arguments of a lawyer in

presenting his client's case strenuously and persistently cannot amount to a
contempt of court so long as the lawyer does not in some way create an
obstruction which blocks the judge in the performance of his judicial duty."
McConnell, 370 U.S. at 236.

As the state has asserted (Respondent's brief,

pp.14-21), an attorney's conduct has more limited First Amendment protections
where he has ceased acting in such manner as to "strenuously and persistently"
present his client's case, and instead is utilizing the judicial proceedings to
express his own personal grievances with the court, or make unsupported
accusations of judicial misconduct.
Certainly, the United States Supreme Court and other appellate courts
have justifiably endeavored to protect an attorney's zealous advocacy for his or
her client.

In In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (ih Cir. 1972), the Seventh Circuit

Court of Appeals recognized McConnell as requiring "that attorneys be given
great latitude in the area of vigorous advocacy," and that "[a]ppellate courts must
ensure that trial judges (or the jury on remand) are not left free to manipulate the
balance between vigorous advocacy and obstructions so as to chill effective
advocacy when deciding lawyer contempts." Dellinger, 461 at 398. Additionally,
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"[l]t is the right of counsel for every litigant to press his claim, even if it appears
farfetched and untenable, to obtain the court's considered ruling. Full enjoyment
of that right, with due allowance for the heat of controversy, will be protected by
appellate courts when infringed by trial courts." Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449
(1975). However, if a court's "ruling is adverse, there is no right of counsel to
resist or insult the judge." State ex rel. Tannenbaum v. Clark, 838 S.W.2d 26,
34-35 (Mo. App. 1992) (citing Maness, 449 U.S. at 458).
This implication of such precedent is that while legal advocacy is strictly
protected, both through the First Amendment and proper application of the
controlling statutory and common contempt law, conduct engaged in by
attorneys in the course of an ongoing legal proceeding which serves no purpose
of advocacy is not entitled to identical constitutional or statutory protection.
Additionally, while the magistrate and district courts did not expressly hold
that Scott's conduct directly interrupted or obstructed the court's business, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that "[a]n attorney's charge of
judicial bias inherently obstructs the judicial function by undermining the court's
th

ability regulate the trial." In re Gustafson, 650 F.2d 1025 (9 Cir. 1985). Scott's
conduct was clearly intended to disrupt the court simply because it was
calculated to vindicate his own personal grievances rather than to advocate for a
client or otherwise further the ends of justice.
Amicus' reliance on the recent opinion In re Kendall, 712 F.3d 814 (3 rd Cir.
2013) is also misplaced. In Kendall, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals vacated a
trial judge's contempt conviction.

kl

The Court recognized that a judicial
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opinion, the forum of the judge's allegedly contemptuous conduct, "occupies the
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values" and is thus "entitled to
special protection."

kl at 824.

Correspondingly, the Court applied the stringent

"clear and present danger" test, under which the state was required to show that
the judge's conduct constituted a "clear and present danger of prejudicing
ongoing proceedings."

kl

at 825-830. The United States Supreme Court has

previously applied this "clear and present danger" standard in a series of cases
in which members of the press were held in contempt for extrajudicial statements
about ongoing judicial proceedings.

kl

at 825-826 (citing Craig v. Harney, 331

U.S. 367,376 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331,348 (1946); Bridges
v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260-263 (1941)).
Amicus, and Scott, have argued that the lower courts should have applied
this or some other similarly heightened First Amendment standard to his
conduct. Neither Scott nor Amicus, however, has established that Scott's written
tirade against Judge Watkins, conducted during an ongoing legal proceeding but
outside the context of any client advocacy, is entitled to the same First
Amendment protections as either a judicial opinion, or a non-lawyer's public
extrajudicial comments on a pending case.
Finally, the state wishes to respond to Amicus' characterization of Scott's
conviction and the state's role in prosecuting it. Amicus characterizes Scott's
conviction as one "for criticizing a judge," and the state's interest in prosecuting
the case as being rooted in a desire to "shelter[] a judge from criticism." (Amicus
brief, pp. 1, 3.) Amicus also considers it "odd" that the state "seems to prefer that
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Scott have aired his criticism widely through the mass media, rather than in a
motion filed with the Magistrate Division in an obscure misdemeanor case."
(Amicus brief, pp.4-5, n.1)
Such characterizations unfairly misstate the nature of Judge Watkins'
contempt complaint, and the state's prosecution of it.

As the state has

recognized (Respondent's brief, p.16), attorneys and other individuals enjoy a
First Amendment right to criticize judges under many circumstances.

Lawyers

have broad First Amendment rights to engage in public out-of-court criticism of
judges, and to raise relevant and colorable claims in the context of proper
advocacy during ongoing court proceedings. (kl (citations omitted).) The state
has no "preference" regarding any constitutionally protected means by which
Scott may wish to express his disfavor with Judge Watkins, nor does it have an
interest in quelling such constitutionally protected speech, no matter how widely
it is distributed.

Scott's conviction was based on the nature and circumstances

of his unsupported accusations of judicial misconduct and bias, not simply of any
"criticism" of Judge Watkins. Scott remains free to express criticism of Judge
Watkins or any other judge in any number of constitutionally protected means
and venues. Scott also had the constitutional right to "criticize" Judge Watkins in
the context of proper advocacy for his former client, such as through a motion to
reconsider Watkins' unfavorable pretrial order, by appealing that order, or even
through a motion to disqualify Judge Watkins for bias or misconduct - had Scott
been able to support any of his corresponding allegations.
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Contrary to Amicus' argument, the type of conduct Scott engaged in is not
entitled to heightened First Amendment protection. Amicus has likewise failed to
show that the First Amendment precludes Scott's contempt conviction.
DATED this 4th day of November, 2013.

MARKW0LSON
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 4th day of November, 2013, I caused
two and correct copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE TO
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF to be placed in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, addressed to:
Eric Scott
17 1ih Avenue S. Ste. 205
Nampa, ID 83651
Richard Alan Eppink
American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho Foundation
PO Box 1897
Boise, ID 83701

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
MWO/pm
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